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III INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
CLAUDIA MARTIN

This report covers decisions adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
the last year, which raise new issues or develop particular aspects of the case law of this
tribunal. The first case defines the protection afforded by the American Convention on
Human Rights to indigenous communities in their enjoyment of communal lands and
the limitations of States to dispose of that property, even in cases in which they are not
demarcated and titled. The decision in the Hilaire Case reflects a challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of a 'reservation' made by Trinidad and Tobago
in its declaration recognising the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court. Similar decisions
were adopted in the Benjamin et al, and Constantine et al Cases. On the merits, these
three cases raise the issue of whether the mandatory application of the death penalty
to murder cases in Trinidad and Tobago breach provisions of the American Convention
on Human Rights. Finally, this report addresses the most important innovations in the
new Rules of Procedure adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which
came into force on 1June, 2001. The full text of the decisions as well as the new Rules
of Procedure can be obtained on the website of the Court at www.corteidh.or.cr
The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community vs Nicaragua
I/A Court, The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, Judgment of31 August
2001, Series C No. 79.
The Awas Tingni community ('community') is an indigenous group of over 600 people
belonging to the Mayagna or Sumo ethnic group, located in the Northern Atlantic
Autonomous Region (RAAN) of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. They live based on a
communal property system and subsist through family farming and collective
agriculture, fruit gathering and medicinal plants, hunting and fishing. The community
maintains no title to any portion of their land.
In 1992, the community signed a contract with Maderas y Derivados de Nicaragua,
S.A. (MADENSA) for forest management, and in 1994, the community, MADENSA, and
the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources of Nicaragua (MARENA)
signed a 'forest management agreement', under which MARENA was to facilitate the
demarcation of the community lands. In 1996, the State, through an agreement
sponsored by MARENA and signed by RAAN representing indigenous communities in
that region, and SOLCARSA corporation, granted a 30-year concession to the
SOLCARSA corporation for the removal of lumber from the communal lands.
The community submitted a letter to MARENA requesting that the concession to
SOLCARSA be delayed until an agreement with the community was reached. In
addition, it stated that MARENA had a duty to facilitate the definition of the communal
lands as stated in the agreement signed in 1994. Also, the community submitted a
request to RAAN to conduct a demographic study on the basis of which the ancestral
communal lands would be demarcated.
Later in 1995, the community filed an initial Amparo remedy before the Appellate
Court of Matagalpa against MARENA requesting a nullification of the concession
215

NQHR 2 / 2002

granted to SOLCARSA and a cessation of their pending activities on the community
land. The Civil Panel of the Appellate Court of the Sixth Region of Matagalpa dismissed
this application because it was not filed within 30 days of receiving knowledge of the
concession. The community appealed on the premise that the 30-day expiration period
begins at the last instance of a violation, but the Supreme Court ofJustice disagreed and
affirmed the lower court.
In 1996, the Regular Council of RAAN filed an Amparo remedy before the Appellate
Court of Matagalpa against MARENA for authorising the concession to SOLCARSA
without approval by the plenary Council in violation of Article 181 of the Nicaraguan
Constitution, requesting annulment of the concession. The Court admitted the remedy
but denied relief without comment. On appeal the following year, the Constitutional
Panel of the Supreme Court ofJustice reversed, finding that the concession did in fact
violate Article 181. The plenary Council of RAAN subsequently ratified the concession.
A second Amparo remedy was collaterally filed in 1997 by the community in the civil
division of the Appellate Court of the Sixth Region of Matagalpa against MARENA
requesting: a) the nullification of the concession to SOLCARSA; b) the issuing of an
order to the RAAN to take action in the request submitted by the community regarding
demarcation of their communal lands; and c) the issuing of an order to MARENA to
refrain from agreeing on other concessions to utilise natural resources in the area under
conflict until that area has been demarcated or an agreement is reached with the
community. The Court admitted this application but denied relief and was subsequently
affirmed by the Constitutional Panel of the Supreme Court ofjustice.
Before the Court, the Commission alleged the violation of Articles 1 (Obligation to
Respect Rights), 2 (Domestic Legal Effects), 21 (Right to Property), and 25 (Right to
Judicial Protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
First, the Commission argued that the State violated Article 25 of the American
Convention by not providing an effective remedy to the community to protect its
members against the violation of their fundamental rights. Regarding the court
proceedings, they claimed that Article 25 was breached in three ways: unjustified delay
in deciding the Amparo remedies submitted by the community; rejection of the
remedies without addressing the merits of the request; and delay in enforcing the
judgment that declared the concession to be unconstitutional due to the lack of
approval by the plenary Council of RAAN. The Commission further argued that
Nicaragua has breached Article 25 by not providing an effective land titling system to
protect the right of the community to the property of its ancestral communal land.
Finally, the Commission argues that the State has violated Articles 1 and 2, in relation
to 25, by failing to respect and ensure the right to an effective remedy protected by the
Convention and to adopt the necessary measures to give effect to such a right.
The State contended that it has been active in the process of land titling, including
its 1986 creation of the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) and the adoption
of Law 14 ('Amendment to the Agrarian Reform Law') which provides a legal framework
to carry out the process of land titling for indigenous communities in the country. The
community did not file a single formal request for land titling under this procedure
before domestic courts; therefore, the State argued, they have not been denied judicial
relief. Further, the community did not file an amparo to challenge the concession to
SOLCARSA within the term established by law, though they were aware of the steps
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taken by the State in that respect. In sum, the State argued that Nicaraguan domestic
law provides effective remedies that the community could have utilised, but they were
negligent in pursuing their legal options.
The Court focused its analysis of the alleged violation of Article 25 on two aspects:
1) was there a land titling procedure, and; 2) were the Amparo remedies decided in
accordance with this provision. In reference to the first aspect, the Court found that
Articles 5, 89, and 180 of the Constitution of Nicaragua, in addition to the 1996
establishment of a Demarcation Commission, presents sufficient evidence to sustain that
Nicaragua ensures a domestic right protecting indigenous communal property. While
the Court found the existence of a land titling procedure in Law No. 14, it finally stated
that this process is not applicable to the demarcation and titling of lands held by
indigenous communities. Next, the Court reasoned that Article 25 recognises a State
duty to afford an effective remedy to protect victims against the violation of their rights
as ensured by the American Convention, the State Constitution, and domestic laws.
Thus, Nicaragua's failure to provide an effective procedure for delimitation,
demarcation, and titling of indigenous communal lands constitutes a violation to this
provision.
In response to the second facet, the Court found that domestic courts delayed the
decisions on the Amparo remedies for an unreasonable amount of time, particularly
taking into account the time limitations established by the Nicaraguan Amparo Law,
according to which they must be decided within 45 days. This delay also violated Article
1(1) of the Convention since the State failed to provide effective domestic relief. Finally,
the Court held that Article 2 of the Convention, requiring the State to adopt protective
measures, was violated due to the State's lack of legislation giving effect to the land
titling process. The State thus violated Article 25 in connection to Articles 1 and 2.
Second, the Commission argued that the community has communal property rights
to the land which fall under the protection afforded by Article 21 of the Convention.
They contended that the concession to SOLCARSA violated these property rights by
endangering the cultural integrity of the community and threatening damage to their
forests. They asked that the State adopt measures for the demarcation of their land and
guarantee the protection of their rights to use the land and its resources.
The State claimed that the community is in fact a small group of indigenous people
that resulted from a separation from a larger community during a geographical shift
and that they do not have ancestral rights to the land they now possess. Furthermore,
the State argued that the land claim made by the community is disproportionate to the
number of people listed in the 1995 census (conducted by the State). Finally, they argue
that the logging concession granted to SOLCARSA was restricted to areas considered
'national land' and that, in any event, the corporation has not yet taken any actions on
the land and thus no damage was caused.
Article 21 of the Convention recognises the right to property. The Court reasoned
that 'property' has an 'autonomous meaning' in international human rights law,
independent from the definition provided by domestic laws. In addition, Article 29(b)
of the American Convention establishes that no provision of this treaty may be
interpreted as 'restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized
by virtue of the laws of any State Party...' Through an evolutive interpretation of the
American Convention and in light of the fact that the Constitution of Nicaragua
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protects the right of indigenous people to communal property, the Court concluded
that Article 21 of the Convention also affords protection of this right. The Court said:
'the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood
as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their
economic survival' (para. 149).
Emphasising the importance of the community's spiritual connection to the land and
the existence of applicable indigenous customary practices, the Court held that
possession should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to the land to
obtain official recognition of their rights to that land. However, the Court went on to
say that the boundaries of the land rightly occupied by the community have not been
adequately demarcated by the State, and that the State should: 1) carry out delimitation,
demarcation, and titling of the land belonging to the community, and; 2) until
completing the previous step, abstain from taking any actions or allowing any third
party actions to be taken that might impede the existence or enjoyment of that land.
Considering that actions by public authorities, such as MARENA, are attributable to
the State, the Court held that the State violated the right of the community to the use
and enjoyment of their property when it granted concessions to third parties to utilise
the property and resources located in an area that would correspond to the lands of the
community. In addition, the Court appears to have concluded that the omission ofState
authorities to demarcate and title the community lands also violated the duty of the
State to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment of the right to
property as protected by the Convention. Thus, the Court ruled that Nicaragua was in
breach of Article 21 in connection with Articles 1 and 2 of that treaty.
Finally, the Commission requested that in application of Article 63(1) of the
American Convention the Court declare that the State must: 1) establish a judicial
procedure that will allow prompt demarcation of the claimed lands; 2) abstain from
granting any concession to lands used by the community prior to the resolution of this
dispute; 3) pay equitable compensation for the monetary and moral damage this lack
of land rights has caused the community, and; 4) pay the legal costs incurred by the
community in this dispute.
The State responded by arguing that the concession to SOLCARSA caused no
damage to the disputed land as it had not yet begun any activity in the conceded area.
Furthermore, the claim by the community is 'disproportionate and irrational, and it
refers to an area in which they do not have ancestral possession'. Also, there has been
no alteration of beliefs, customs, or production patterns within the community.
Moreover, the community made no effort to request titling of the land, and failed to
pursue their claim with due diligence, in addition to the fact that there has been
considerable progress with respect to the land titling process of the community. Finally,
Nicaragua is 'one of the poorest States of the hemisphere' and must conserve its
resources for such activities as land titling and demarcation.
The Court considered that it is a matter of customary international law that any
violation of an international obligation which has caused damage calls for adequate
reparations. They held that the State must adopt legislative, administrative, or any other
measures required to create an effective procedure for the delimitation, demarcation,
and titling of the property of indigenous communities, in accordance with their
customary law, values, customs and mores. In addition, regarding the Awas Tingni
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Community, the State must carry out a process of demarcation, delimitation, and titling
of their land within fifteen months, allowing full participation of the community and
taking into account their customary law, values, customs and mores. Until this is
completed, the State must abstain from taking any actions that would affect the value
of the disputed land.
The Court further specified that the community did not suffer material damage, and
that this ruling alone is a reparation. However, the Court felt that immaterial damages
must also be repaired through monetary compensation and ordered the State to invest
US $50,000 within 12 months in works or services for the benefit of the community
under the supervision of the Commission.
Finally, the Court assessed the expenses and costs incurred by the members of the
community and their representatives in litigating this case in domestic and international
proceedings to amount to US $30,000, and required the State to pay this amount within
six months.
Hilairevs Trinidadand Tobago
I/A Court,HilaireCase, PreliminaryObjectionsJudgmentof 1 September2001, Series C No. 80.
In May 1995, Mr. Hilaire was convicted for a murder committed in February 1991.
Although Mr. Hilaire had no prior criminal offenses, he was convicted under the
Trinidad and Tobago 'Offenses Against the Person Act', which stipulates a mandatory
death sentence by law. The Act does not permit the judge or jury to mitigate the
sentence, nor to take into account the personal circumstances of each case. Mr. Hilaire
appealed once to the Court ofAppeal ofTrinidad and Tobago, and twice to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in London, all of which were dismissed.
Due to the urgent circumstances of Mr. Hilaire's imminent death sentence, the Court
ruled on provisional measures as requested by the Commission ordering the State to
refrain from executing the alleged victim until the organs of the Inter-American System
completed their consideration of the case. The Commission argued violations ofArticles
4(1) (arbitrary deprivation of life), 5(1) (deprivation of physical, mental, and moral
integrity), 5(2) (subjugation to cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment), 5(6) (failing
to incorporate social reform into punishment), and 7(5) (failure to try defendant in a
reasonable time), all in conjunction with a violation of Article 1(1), all protected by the
American Convention on Human Rights.
The State submitted preliminary objections to the admissibility of the complaint as
well as to the jurisdiction of the Court. In its objection to the admissibility of the
complaint, the State argued that the claim of an Article 4(1) violation was submitted by
the Commission after the Article 46 stipulated 6-month time limit passed, thus making
it inadmissible. The Commission responded that Trinidad and Tobago should be
prevented from raising admissibility issues at this stage of the procedure because it
waived its right to challenge the admissibility of the petition and submitted its
observation on the merits of the case. Additionally, the Commission stated that the
exception to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies contemplated in Article
46(2)(a) is applicable to the case because the State does not afford due process under
its domestic legislation. Alternatively, the Commission argued that, under its Rules of
Procedure, petitioners must submit the facts that might constitute a human rights
violation, but they do not necessarily have to indicate every article that might be
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breached in a particular case. The Court held that Article 32(c) of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure 'expressly allows for the possibility that "no specific reference [be]
made to the article(s) alleged to have been violated" in order for a complaint to be
processed before it' (para. 42). Thus, the Court concluded that when additional
arguments regarding violations of other rights are pleaded on the basis of the same
facts originally submitted by a petitioner, such a pleading cannot be dismissed on the
basis that they were not argued at the initial petition or that specific articles of the
Convention were not implicated.
The State next argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the present case
because of the reservation filed by Trinidad and Tobago when recognising the
compulsory jurisdiction of this tribunal. The reservation, as applicable to this case,
reads: '[T]he Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, recognises the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (...) only to such
extent that recognition is consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago ...' The State indicated that Article 75 of the
American Convention as interpreted by the Court permits that reservations be made to
that treaty, provided they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention. Trinidad and Tobago argued that its reservation is not incompatible with
the object and purpose of the American Convention because it is related to the
recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and, consequently, it does not
restrict the scope of the rights protected by this treaty. Alternately, it contended that if
the Court finds the reservation incompatible with the Convention, the declaration made
by the State recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is invalid. Thus, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the present case.
The Commission first contended that the reservation is excessively vague and
ambiguous and leaves the decision on whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear a case
to the State's discretion, thereby undermining the Court's authority to determine its
own jurisdiction. Additionally, the Commission argued that the reservation is invalid
under the permissible grounds authorised by Article 62 of the Convention, according
to which a State's declaration recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court may
be made 'unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specific period or for
specific cases'. Furthermore, under Article 75 of the same treaty, the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and must therefore be
declared invalid by the Court. Finally, the Commission contended that if the Court finds
the reservation invalid, it should sever the impugned terms from the declaration of
acceptance made by the State instead of annulling such declaration in toto.
The Court held that it has the right to declare its competence to hear a case, and that
any objection 'taken by the State for the purpose of somehow affecting the Court's
jurisdiction has no consequence whatever, as the Court retains the competence de la
competence, as it is master of its ownjurisdiction' (para. 81). Thus, the Court held that the
reservation does not fall within the permissible grounds stated in Article 62(2) of the
American Convention. In addition, it has a general scope that it subordinates the
application of the provision of this treaty to the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago,
thereby making this reservation manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose
of the Convention. In sum, the Court ruled that the objection to itsjurisdiction must be
dismissed.
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It is worth noting that the Court failed to expressly address the argument raised by
the Commission regarding severability of reservations found incompatible with the
provisions of the American Convention. The Court in this respect appeared to assume
that if the reservation is declared invalid, the full provision as it stands should continue
to bind the State. This assumption is reinforced by the Court when it stated that a State
can only release itself from the Convention 'by following the provisions that the treaty
itself stipulates'. This statement could imply that a State can submit limitations to the
declaration recognising thejurisdiction only if they are in accordance with Article 62(2);
otherwise, the State must denounce the treaty as provided by Article 78 of the American
Convention if it wants to release itself from the international obligations assumed when
ratifying this treaty.
1

NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ADOPTED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AT ITS 4 gfH SESSION HELD FROM 16-25
NOVEMBER 2000. IN FORCE SINCEJUNE 1, 2001.

The most important innovation of the new Rules of Procedure of the Court is contained
in Article 23, stipulating that once the case has been submitted to this tribunal, the
alleged victims, their next of kin or accredited representatives (hereinafter 'victims') are
granted independent standing to submit their requests, arguments and evidence
throughout the proceedings before the Court. Under Article 61(1) of the American
Convention, however, only the Commission or State Parties to this treaty may institute
proceedings before the Court.
Article 23 of the Rules is complemented by Article 35(4), which provides that after
notification of the application to the victims, they must submit their own request,
arguments, and evidence within 30 days. In this respect, it is worth noting that
regulations are unclear on whether victims are limited by the legal issues raised by the
Commission (or a State Party) in its brief or if they can allege additional breaches to the
Convention when submitting their own 'requests or arguments'. Furthermore, the new
rules authorise victims to introduce their own evidence, including the request to appoint
witnesses and expert witnesses; however, the party that requests the evidence must
afford the costs of its production (Article 45).
Other provisions of the new rules tend to reinforce a broad participation of the
victims in all aspects of the procedure, in particular: the power to interrogate witnesses
and expert witnesses in oral hearings (Articles 41 and 42), to object to the hearing of a
witness and the appointment of expert witnesses (Articles 48 and 49), to request the
Court to adopt provisional measures (Article 25), and to submit a request for
interpretation of particular aspects of a decision on the merits or on reparations as
provided by Article 67 of the American Convention (Article 58).
The new Rules of the Court remain unclear about whether the Commission could
continue to represent victims before the Court in cases in which victims do not have the
resources to afford an international proceeding, opt not to participate in the
proceedings or appoint a legal representative. The Rules only provide that the
Commission will be represented by its Delegates, whom can be assisted by persons of
their choice, thereby leaving open the possibility that the victims or their legal
representatives be appointed as advisors.
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Finally, in addition to the autonomous participation of the victims, the new Rules
incorporate another relevant procedural development related to the production of the
evidence. Article 43 provides that the evidence produced before the Commission will
be admitted by the Court as long as minimum rules of due process are respected, in
particular the principle of equality of arms. The Court will retain its power to request
that in exceptional circumstances the evidence be reproduced by the parties at the
Court proceedings.

IV AFRICA
RACHEL MURRAY

1

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY/AFRICAN UNION

(OAU/AU)

The first meeting of the Committee of Experts established under the African Charter
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is due to take place in May 2002 in Ethiopia,
with the aim of considering the Rules of Procedure, guidelines for State reporting and
a work programme for the Committee.
2

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

An Experts Meeting was convened from 12-16 November 2001 in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, to examine the Draft Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, as adopted
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Forty-four States were
represented at the meeting, and a statement was made by the Special Rapporteur of the
African Commission on the Rights of Women in Africa, Dr Angelo Melo.' The meeting
examined the various provisions of the Draft Protocol. Amendments included merging
the two provisions on elimination of violence and right to life, integrity and security of
the person into one article and reformulating the provision on elimination of harmful
practices. Of particular concern among delegates was the provision stating 18 years as
a minimum age for marriage and the article on polygamy. No consensus was reached
and three alternative provisions were suggested ranging from 'polygamy shall be
prohibited' to requiring that it be subject to mutual consent of the parties, with States
being obliged to encourage monogamy as the preferred form. A new article was inserted
on monitoring and implementation of the Protocol which required that States should
include reference to respect for the Protocol in their Article 62 reports before the
African Commission and that a State ensure an effective remedy for violation of the
Protocol. The African Commission was affirmed as the body entrusted with interpreting
the Protocol.
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Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Draft Protocol to the African Charteron Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 12-16 November 2001, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
Expt/Prot.Women/Rpt. (I).

